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COMMENTS
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY-ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
On March 22, 1965 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp.1 abolished charitable immunity. That
doctrine had been part of Pennsylvania jurisprudence for threequarters of a century 2 and was reaffirmed as recently as 1961. 3 The
question to be discussed in this Comment is whether Flagiello
will be applied retroactively to causes of action not barred by the
statute of limitations. 4 This question, though limited in the number of cases in which it can arise, has been squarely raised in one
lower court case 5 and may be in issue in a federal case.' Furthermore, the resolution of this question involves considerations of
the basic theory of judicial decision making.
The general rule expounded by the courts in civil litigation is
that the overruling of decisional law by a court of final jurisdiction
is retroactive and the decisional law announced in the overruled
decision never was the law.7 The overruled decision is no longer
1.
2.
3.
A.2d 769
4.

417 Pa. 486, 209 A.2d 193 (1965).
Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp., 404 Pa. 424, 172
(1961).
PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953) provides:
Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury
wrongfully done to the person, in cases where the injury does not
result in death, must be brought within two years from the time
when the injury was done and not afterward; in cases where the
injury does result in death the limitation of action shall remain as
now established by law.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1603 (1953), provides that when the injury does
result in death the limitation of the action is one year after the date of
death. See, Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959); Schaffer
v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963); Flannery v. Giebus, 38 Pa.
Dl. & C.2d 540 (C.P. 1965).
5. Lenhart v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 309, Pa. C.P. of (Lehigh) Sept.
T., 1965. The question was raised by preliminary objection and is not yet
decided.
6. Landis v. Pottstown Hosp., No. 41362, U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. of Pa.,
1966. Alleged negligent act occurred between June 7, 1964 and August 14,
1964. The injury became known on January 4, 1965-two and one-half
months prior to Flagiello. But see, Honeywell v. Rogers, 251 F. Supp. 841
(W.D. Pa. 1966) (assuming Flagiello to be retroactive).
7. Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apts., 16 N.J. 47,
106 A.2d 271 (1954); Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950); Gregory
v. Salem General Hosp., 174 Or. 464, 153 P.2d 837 (1944); City of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 25 A.2d 406 (1942) (dictum), cert.
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authoritative precedent, but it remains the law as to the case in
which it was announced.' Upon this general rule courts have
engrafted some exceptions, based on reliance, to off-set the hardship caused by making all civil decisions retroactive. Traditionally
the exceptions have been characterized as or limited to contract
rights created, or property rights vested in reliance on overruled
precedent.9 Several jurisdictions have expanded the reliance test,
however, to include tort law to determine whether the abolition of
charitable immunity should only be applied prospectively.' 0
Prospective overruling has been criticized as a judicial infringement on the legislative function being contrary to the common
law fiction of the Blackstonian or declaratory theory of law." The
declaratory theory in its simplest form is that judges do not make
law but only discover the best evidence of what the law ought to be.
This theory accounts for the general rule of retroactivity in civil
litigation. Courts today have generally repudiated this theory and
12
recognize that judges do make law.

In repudiating the declaratory theory the courts have also recognized that they have the inherent power to overrule decisional
law retroactively, partially retroactively 13 or prospectively. Justice
denied, 317 U.S. 649 (1942); Menges v. City of Philadelphia, 36 Pa. D. & C.
352 (C.P. 1939) (dictum). See 21 C.J.S., Courts § 194 (1940).
8. See Love v. Temple Univ., 422 Pa. 30, 220 A.2d 838 (1966) (by
implication); Menges v. City of Philadelphia, 36 Pa. D. & C. 352 (C.P. 1939).
9. Mickel v. New England Coal & Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671, 47 A.2d
187 (1946); Nickoll v. Racine Cloak & Suit Co., 194 Wis. 298, 216 N.W. 502
(1927); Schantz Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 525 (Orphans' Ct. 1964). See
Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against Retroactive Operation of an
Overruling, 18 COLuM. L. REV. 230 (1918).

10. Darling v. Charleston Community Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960);
Terracciona v. Magee, 53 N.J. Super. 557, 158 A.2d 68 (1959), following
Dalton v. St. Lukes Catholic Hosp., 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958); Kojis
v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis.2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, 292 (1961); Rivera v.
Misericordia Hosp., 15 Wis.2d 351, 112 NW.2d 918 (1962); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc. 23 Wis.2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
11. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (1769).
See also GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 93, 218-19 (2d ed. 1921).
12. E.g., Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965),
wherein the court stated:
The wide-sweeping effect of the decision in Linkletter [Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1963)] seems to abandon once and
for all the Blackstonian concept that judges do not make, but
merely discover the law, and that overruled decisions were never
the law, but merely erroneously declared concepts....
Id. at 123, 213 A.2d at 673. See also, Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst
Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S.
175 (1863).

13.

The term "partially retroactive," is a judicial hybrid to denote the

situation where the court overrules the established rule of law prospectively

only, but applies the new pronouncement to the adjudicated case. See
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959); Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131, 292
(1961).
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Cardozo, in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co.,14
in holding there was no denial of due process when a state court
applied a prior rule of law to the adjudicated case and announced a
new rule to govern future occurrences, stated:
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent
may make a choice between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that
decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are
law none the less for the intermediate transactions....
On the other hand, it may hold to the ancient doctrine that
the law declared by its court had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event the
discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never
been, and the reconsidered declaration as law from the
beginning ....

The choice for any state may be deter-

mined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her
courts, their conception of law, its origin and nature. 15
Beyond demonstrating the inherent power of courts to adopt
either philosophy the Sunburst decision also made specific reference
to the reliance test. Justice Cardozo was of the opinion that prospective application was proper "whenever injustice or hardship
will thereby be averted."'16 If a court adopts the "relation backward" principle or the declaratory theory it should be restricted
by the reliance test. Yet, no court has adopted the "principle of
forward operation" or the doctrine of prospective operation as
an absolute part of its jurisprudence. What has apparently developed from Justice Cardozo's philosophical position is an acceptance of retroactivity as a general rule, with prospective application being the exception, to avoid resultant undue hardship or
injustice caused by reliance on the overruled precedent.
The divergence among the jurisdictions that have considered
the problem of prospective or retroactive abolition of charitable
immunity seems to be focused on whether reliance is presumed or
whether reliance must be factually demonstrated. Categorically,
the jurisdictions requiring factual demonstration of reliance have
held the abrogation of the immunity to be retroactive; the jurisdictions that presume reliance have held it prospective.
The presumption of reliance is a presumption of law. It is a
procedural device employed in certain cases as a substantive rule
of law to the effect that reliance is presumed when specific circum14. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).

See also Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495 (1859)

wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
[T]he law relating to the transaction in controversy, at the time
when it is complete, shall be an inherent element of the case, and
shall guide the decision; and that the case shall not be altered, in
its substance, by any subsequent law.
Id. at 499.
15. Id. at 364-65.
1l6. Id. at 364,

Winter 1967]

COMMENTS

stances exist.17 In other words, reliance is a conclusion of law
based on the existence of prior decisions creating or upholding
the immunity. The underlying reason for the presumption is not
clear; it may be the court's reluctance to subject defendants to
the difficult task of showing the necessary reliance; or that courts
feel reliance is, or should be, the normal course of human conduct;
or simply judicial convenience. Regardless of the reason for the
presumption of reliance, the presumption should reflect the factual
truth of the situation. If it does not, the conclusion of law should
not be adopted by the court as a basis for its decision.
The presumption of reliance, as a rationale for the doctrine of
prospective operation, has been employed in Michigan,' Wisconsin, 9 Illinois 20 and Minnesota 2 in the charitable and governmental
immunity areas. In Parker v. Port Huron Hosp.,2 2 relied on
heavily by the Pennsylvania court in Flagiello, charitable immunity was abolished in Michigan. The Parker court, recognizing that
charitable immunity had not been reviewed in twelve years,
stated:
In the interest of justice and fairness, in view of the
new ruling and the reliance that some, albeit few, charitable, nonprofit hospital corporations may have placed on
the old ruling, and may have failed to protect themselves
by the purchase of available insurance, we believe the new
rule should apply to the instant case and to all future
causes of action arising after
23 September 15, 1960, the date
of the filing of this opinion.
The Parker court does not specify exactly what the "interest of
justice and fairness" includes, it does, however, make reference to
the failure to acquire available insurance protection.
24
The Parker court had the earlier decision of Bricker v. Green
as authority for using the doctrine of prospective operation. In
Bricker the rule of imputed negligence was abrogated and the court
applied the new rule to that case and all future cases. There is no
17. See Bank of Philadelphia v. Posey, 130 Miss. 825, 95 So. 134 (1923);
Continental Supply Co. v. Abell, 95 Mont. 148, 24 P.2d 133 (1933).
18. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
See also Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961)
(governmental immunity), subsequently limited in Sayers v. School Dist.
No. 1, 366 Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962); McDowell v. Mackie, 365
Mich. 268, 112 N.W.2d 491 (1961).
19. Kojis v. Doctors Hosp., 12 Wis.2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961). See
also Holyte v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)
(governmental immunity).
20. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965). See also Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.
No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (governmental immunity).
21. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795
(Minn. 1962) (governmental immunity). See 47 MINN. L. REV. 1124 (1963).
22. 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
23. Id. at 28, 105 N.W.2d at 14 (Emphasis added.).
24. 313 Mich. 218, 21 N.W.2d 105 (1946).
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indication in Bricker as to why the rule of imputed negligence was
removed prospectively. Oddly enough, the Bricker court cited
Reiter v. Grober2 5 wherein the Wisconsin court, discussing the nature of the rule of imputed negligence, stated it "would not for a
moment give countenance
to an argument that the wrongdoer re'2 6
lied upon it."

Courts which use the doctrine of prospective operation characteristically do not set forth the reasoning supporting the doctrine or
the justification, either factual or legal, for the presumption of
reliance. The Parker court was of the opinion that probably few
charitable hospitals had failed to acquire insurance protection.
The court nevertheless felt that it was better to protect the few
uninsured hospitals, rather than remove the immunity for all
cases not barred by the statute of limitations. The obvious injustice
in this position is that it prevents parties injured prior to the date
of the Parker decision from recovering against hospitals that had
protected themselves by liability insurance.
In Wisconsin charitable immunity was abrogated in Kojis v.
Doctors Hosp.27 The Wisconsin court in a supplemental opinion 28
to Kojis followed Parker and Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302,29 which held the abrogation of governmental immunity to be prospective. Like the Parker court, the Kojis court
held the immunity was no longer a defense to any cause of action
arising after the date of the decision. In two subsequent cases8 °
the rule announced in Kojis was applied to bar recovery for alleged negligent acts by charitable institutions occurring prior to
the date of decision in Kojis.
In Illinois the doctrine of prospective operation, based on the
judicial presumption of reliance, was followed in Molitor. This
case involved a minor plaintiff's claim against a school district for
injuries sustained in an accident involving the defendant's school
bus, on which plaintiff was a passenger. The Illinois court held
policy and justice required a departure from the tort immunity provided school districts, but was "cognizant of the fact that retrospective application . . may result in great hardship to school districts which have relied on prior decisions .
,"31 This acceptance
of the fact that retroactive application may cause injustice or un:due hardship is the judicial presumption of reliance.
The Illinois court applied the doctrine of prospective operation
in abolishing its modified charitable immunity in Darling v.
25. 173 Wis. 493, 181 N.W. 739 (1921).
26. Id. at 495, 181 N.W. at 740.
27. 12 Wis.2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131 (1961).
28. 12 Wis.2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961).
29. 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
30. Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis.2d 324, 127 N.W.2d
50 (1964); Rivera v. Misericordia Hosp., 15 Wis.2d 351, 112 N.W.2d 918
(1962).
31. 18 Il.2d 11, 26, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959).
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Charleston Community Memorial Hosp.3 2 Charitable immunity
had been modified in Moore v. Moyle3 3 to permit recovery against
a nontrust fund of the charitable corporation. The specific nontrust fund involved was the proceeds of the insurance coverage of
the charitable institution. This modification gave the charitable
institution, by the amount of liability insurance coverage it elected
to carry, if any, the power to determine whether it would be liable
and the extent of its liability.
In Darlingthe presumption of reliance to hold the abrogation of
the immunity as prospective is understandable. A defendant charitable institution could point to Moyle and demonstrate by the extent of its liability insurance coverage, if any, the requisite reliance.
Under Moyle the defense of immunity was waived to the extent
of the liability insurance coverage or it remained if no liability insurance was procured. Therefore, in this peculiar situation, reliance could be shown no matter which position was adopted.
Courts, like the Illinois court, which employ the doctrine of
prospective operation, based on presumed reliance, apply the new
rule of law to the case in which it was announced. This is frequently termed "partially retroactive" application. In Darling the
court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff that was in excess of
the liability insurance coverage of the defendant hospital. The
Molitor court remanded the case to the lower court for a determination of the issue of negligence. The reasons given to justify the
application of the new rule to the adjudicated case were stated in
Molitor:
At least two compelling reasons exist for applying the new
rule to the instant case while otherwise limiting its application to cases arising in the future. First, if we were to
merely announce the rule without applying it here, such
announcement would amount to mere dictum. Second,
and more important, to refuse to apply the new rule here
would deprive appellant of any benefit from his effort and
expense in challenging the old rule which we now declare
erroneous. Thus there would be no incentive to appeal the
not in any
upholding of precedent since appellant could
4
event benefit from a reversal invalidating it.3
It is interesting to note that the defendant in the adjudicated
case is not given the benefit of the presumption of reliance. As to
such a defendant the factors of "dictum" and "reward" off-set the
presumption. Thus, even though a defendant in the adjudicated
case may have in fact adopted a position in reliance on the precedent, and may in fact suffer undue hardship or injustice, the new
rule is applied to the defendant. 35
32.
33.
34.
35.
held the

33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
18 Ill.2d 11, 28, 163 N.E.2d 89, 97 (1959).
Three years subsequent to the first Molitor case the Illinois court
defendant school district liable as to all the injured passengers
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In Bassi v. Langlass,3 6 involving the question of whether county judges should be permitted to continue to practice law during
their judgeship, the Illinois court also utilized the doctrine of
prospective operation. In two prior cases 37 the court had recognized that it was inconsistent with the judicial office, but held
there was no legal means to prohibit the practice. In Bassi the
public policy was held to be sufficient to proscribe the practice.
The decision, however, was to be applied purely prospectively to
judges thereafter elected because the attorneys who sought the
county judgeships had presumably relied on the prior decisions,
which condoned the practice because of inadequate remuneration
received by the county judges.
The Bassi court did not apply the new rule to the defendant
in that case. In a case involving a course of conduct instead of
tort liability the factors of "reward" and "dictum" apparently do
not compel the application of the new rule to the defendant in the
adjudicated case. Yet, the plaintiff in the adjudicated case does not
receive his "reward" and the announced rule of law is surely "dictum."
Among the jurisdictions that have applied the loss of the immunity retroactively, New Jersey has the most delineated rule. In
38
1959 the New Jersey Superior Court in Terracciona v. Magee
held that the abolition of the immunity, as announced in Dalton v.
St. Lukes Catholic Hosp.,3 9 did reach back to all causes of action not
barred by the statute of limitations. In so holding the Magee
court adopted the position taken in Dalton, wherein the latter
court stated:
It thus appears that for some time past there has been no
reasonable basis for reliance on the unimpaired continuance of the immunity; indeed, reliance has very little place
anywhere in the field of torts and the defendant has not
suggested that its standard of care or the scope of its insurance
coverage was actually influenced by the immun40
ity.
The Dalton court expressly questioned whether reasonable or
justifiable reliance could be demonstrated because of the clear indications of the immunity's downfall found in previous New Jersey
42
cases.4" The 1957 case of Lokar v. Church of the Sacred Heart
by treating the original appeal as a "test case." See, Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 24 Ill.2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962).
36. 22 Ill.2d 190, 174 N.E.2d 682 (1961).
37. Town of Bruce v. Dickey, 116 Ill. 527, 6 N.E. 435 (1886); O'Hare
v. Chicago, Madison & Northern R.R. Co., 139 Il. 151, 28 N.E. 923 (1891).
38. 53 N.J. Super. 557, 158 A.2d 68 (1959).
39. 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958).
40. Id. at 27, 141 A.2d at 275.
41. Lindroth v. Christ Hosp., 21 N.J. 588, 123 A.2d 10 (1956); Rafferzeder v. Raleigh, 33 N.J. Super. 19, 109 A.2d 296 (1955); Woods v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 6 N.J. Super. 47, 69 A.2d 742 (1949).
42. 24 N.J. 549, 133 A.2d 12 (1957).
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had upheld the immunity theory by an equally divided court.
What seems to be important, however, is that the court did not
completely foreclose the possibility of factual demonstration of
the requisite reliance. Thus, even though the quality of the reliance was doubtful, had the defendant been able to show that "its
standard of care or the scope of its insurance coverage" had been
affected, the reliance exception might have been followed.
In the recent case of In re Kloppenberg43 the New Jersey rule
was capsulized by that court as follows:
[A] decision overruling a former doctrine may be limited
to prospective application only where a defendant demonstrates affirmatively that he has been prejudiced to a substantial degree by justifiable reliance
upon a rule previ44
ously stated by the highest court.
The New Jersey rule severely limits the possibility of purely prospective application of a newly proclaimed doctrine because the defendant must prove the cumulative elements of the exception to
escape the general rule of retroaction.
This limitation was illustrated in Kloppenberg. The administrator of the estate had made distribution while the construction of
a statute was pending in the New Jersey Supreme Court. The
court ruled that the administrator could not come within the exception because his alleged reliance could not have been based on a
decision of the highest court.
Arizona 45 and Alaska both abolished governmental immunity
46
retroactively. The Alaska court in City of Fairbanks v. Schiable
removed the mantle of immunity from tort liability previously enjoyed by municipal corporations. In Schiable the court, in dictum,
held the new rule was to be applied only prospectively because of
the municipality's reliance on earlier lower court decisions and to
avoid the resultant hardships.
Subsequent to the Schiable decision the Alaska court in Scheele
v. City of Anchorage47 was confronted directly with the question
of whether the removal of immunity was retroactive. Scheele involved an action to recover for personal injuries sustained as a
result of alleged police brutality occurring two years prior to the
Schiable decision. The Alaska court admitted that the prospective
application announced in Schiable was based on presumed reliance
which may have resulted-in the municipality's failure to protect
43. 82 N.J. Super. 117, 196 A.2d 800 (1964). See also Arrow Builders
Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apts., 16 N.J. 47, 106 A.2d 271 (1954) (per
curiam); Sofman v. Denham Food Service, Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168
(1962).
44. 82 N.J. Super. at 120, 196 A.2d at 801. (Emphasis added.)
45. Stone v. Arizona Highway Coun'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
(1963).
46. 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962).
47. 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963).
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itself with liability insurance. In Scheele the court changed its
position and held that the removal of immunity was retroactive.
This change in position was based on plaintiff's demonstration
that in 1958 a federal district court in Lucas v. City of Juneau48
construed an Alaska statute49 as abolishing governmental immunity. Thus, the Scheele court held that the reliance presumed in
Schiable was not reasonable or justified.
The Scheele court's decision was not based on the municipality's factual non-reliance, but rather on the quality of the reliance.
Under the New Jersey rule the presence of a prior decision such as
Lucas would limit the defendant's prospects of affirmatively demonstrating justifiable reliance. It should be noted that the Alaska
court, unlike the New Jersey court, does not require the precedent
to be a pronouncement of the state's highest tribunal.
Perhaps the most practical and novel solution to the problem
of the point of departure of charitable immunity was advanced by
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Myers v. Drozda. 0 Instead of
placing the burden on the defendant to prove the cumulative elements of the New Jersey rule, the Myers court simply held that reliance or non-reliance was manifested in whether the charitable
institution did or did not have liability insurance coverage. In
effect, if the institution had no liability insurance coverage it
was deemed to have relied on the immunity theory and consequently not liable. Conversely, if the institution had liability insurance coverage at the time the cause of action arose it was deemed
not to have relied and, therefore, was liable to the extent of the insurance coverage. 5 1
Though judicially novel this position is supportable by logic.
In every jurisdiction that has considered the point of departure of
either charitable or governmental immunity, whether requiring
factual demonstration of reliance or employing the presumption of
reliance, the primary hardship or injustice referred to is failure to
48. 168 F. Supp. 195 (D. Alaska 1958).
49. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070 (1949).
50. 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
51. In the landmark case of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), Justice Rutledge expressed reservations in the concept of measuring liability by the presence or absence of insurance coverage by stating:
While insurance should not, perhaps, be made a criterion of responsibility, its prevalence and low cost are important considerations in evaluating the fears, or supposed ones, of dissipation or
deterrence. What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is
the cost of reasonable protection, the amount of the insurance
premium as an added burden on its finances, not the awarding
over in damages of its entire assets.
130 F.2d at 824.
Justice Rutledge was concerned with the situation created by Moore
v. Moyle, note 33 supra, rather than using insurance as a measure of reliance. See also, Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952); 15 AM. JUR.2d, Charities §
154 (1964).
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acqiire" adequate insurance protection. The injustice of making a
charity, whether a multi-million dollar hospital or a small rural
orphanage, satisfy a judgment out of its assets is obvious. If reliance on court-made precedent results in -the charities' failure to
protect themselves the same court should not penalize the charities for such reliance.
Under the Myers rule the quality of the reliance, whether reasonable 'or justifiable, does not have to be judicially measured.
Nebraska's ' partial immunity, which permitted invitees to recover
but not patients, 2 had not been reexamined in eleven years.55
The quality of the reliance becomes difficult to measure when there
are previous decisions upholding the immunity, but the immunity
his been qualified by factual distinctions. Beyond the- qualifications the trend in other jurisdictions .has been against the immunity. 54 In such a factual setting how does a court determine
whether reliance Was reasonable or justifiable?,
The difficulties in balancing the "reward" and "dictum" factors
against the reliance of the defendant in the adjudicated case are
avoided under the Myers 'rule." The liability of the instant 'defendant and the liability' of all other potential 'defendants is determined.-by the insurance inquiry.' This position is more equitable
than to place liability on a defendant: charity, which may have in
fact relied on the precedent, because the court does not want its
judicial utterances to be labeled "dictum" or because .of the court's
compulsion to encourage appeals by "reward."
There appears to be one shortcoming under the Myers rule.
Once tie court has found that the charitable institution did not
rely, i.e., the institution had insurance coverage, there is no reason-to limit the liability to the extent of the insurance coverage.
This limitation'of liability.only .applies to causes of action arising
prior to the date of the Myers decision. As to all causes of action
arising after that date there is no limitation on a plaintiff's re52. Sed'Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp. Ass'n, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N.W.
-208 (1918). See also Cheatham v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 160
Neb.. 297, 70 N.W.2d 96 (1955); Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 160
.Neb. .279, 70 .N.W.2d 86 (1955); Duncan ,v. Nebraska Sanitarium & Benevolent :Ass'n,'.92 Neb. 162, 137 N.W."1120 (1912).
I 53. Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., note 52 supra; Cheatham v.
ishop Clarkson Memorial H6sp., note 52 supra.
S54. See generally PROSSER, ToRTS '§ 127 (3d ed. 1964). But see, Helton
V. Sisters of. Mercy, 351 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1961); McEvoy v. Hartford Hosp.,
22 Conn. Supp. 366, 173 A.2d357 (1961); Richardson'v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc.,
135 Ind. App. 1, 191 N.E.2d 337 (1963); Cornelius v. Sanai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 219 Md. 116, 148 A.2d 567 (1959); Grueninger v.. President and
Fellows of Harvard College, 178 N.E.2d 917 (Mass. 1961); Schulte v. Missionaries of LaSalette Corp. , 352 S.W2.d 636 (Mo. 1961); Springer v. Federated Church of Reno, 283"P.2d 107i (Nev. 1955); Williams v. Union County
Hosp. Ass'n, 234 N. Car.. 536, 67 S.E.2d: 662 (1651); Watkins v. Southcrest
Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966);. Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n.v. Hayes,
123 S.E.2d 559 (Va. 1961).
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covery. The Myers court, referring to the limitation of liability,
stated:
A differentiating factor between a charity and its insurer
is reliance. An insured charity does not rely justifiably on
the exemption within the limits of the insurer's liability.
The impact of liability upon an insurer should55 be relatively light because of its ability to spread the loss.

The Myers court seems to be interjecting a new elementquantity of reliance. This quantity of reliance determines the
scope of the insurance coverage and the extent of liability. It
would seem that if reliance is a shield against liability, nonreliance
should permit unlimited liability.
Its simplicity and realistic approach are the virtues of the
Myers rule. Insurance is the best manifestation of reliance or nonreliance. If the cause of action comes within the scope of risks insured against, the immunity defense should not be available to the
charity. Under Nebraska decisional law prior to Myers, the
charity was liable for its negligent acts resulting in injury to
invitees. 56 If the charity insured against the risk of injury to invitees this could not be construed as non-reliance on the partial
immunity. The Myers rule removes the factual inaccuracies of the
presumption of reliance. It alleviates injustice to a defendant in
an adjudicated case by employing the insurance inquiry to such a
defendant and all potential defendants. It provides for more just
results than the stringent New Jersey rule, which requires factual
demonstration of reliance.
Presently under Pennsylvania law there is no patent answer to
whether Flagiello is to be applied retroactively. While the general
rule of retroactivity of new doctrines of law in civil litigation, with
the reliance exceptions as to vested property rights and contractual
obligations, is recognized in Pennsylvania57 there are no clear indications that the exception will be extended to include the tort
doctrine of charitable immunity.
The removal of immunity was applied retroactively in the recent federal district court case of Honeywell v. Rogers.58 The negligent act, with the resultant physical injury becoming apparent
shortly thereafter, occurred in February 1962, two years prior to
Flagiello. The district court, apparently due to the defendant hospital's failure to raise the issue of the retroactive application of
Flagiello,assumed that the removal of the immunity was applicable.
An indication of the attitude of the Pennsylvania Supreme
55.

180 Neb. at 189, 141 N.W.2d at 855.

56. See cases cited note 52

SUpTa.

57. City of Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 25 A.2d 406
(1942) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 649 (1942); Menges v. City of Philadelphia,
36 Pa. D. & C. 352 (C.P. 1939); Schantz Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 525 (Orphans' Ct. 1964) (by implication).
58. 251 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
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Court concerning retroactivity of newly announced doctrines in
civil litigation is found in the analogous area of constitutional law
affecting criminal procedure. Although this attitude is primarily
dictated by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it
will be beneficial nonetheless to briefly examine this area. Generally the Supreme Court cases dealing with the question of retroactive application of new constitutional standards have looked to
the "purpose of our new standard ... the reliance which may have
been placed upon prior decisions on the subject, and the effect on
the administration of justice of a retroactive application ..
It should be noted that the reliance criterion has not been independently significant in determining whether a newly announced
constitutional standard should have retroactive application. The
court has used it in conjunction with the standard's effect on the
administration of justice.60 Moreover, the reliance criterion is
measured by whether a particular procedure was adopted by a state
on reliance of prior decisions ratifying the old standard.61
In Commonwealth ex rel Shadd v. Myers6 2 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in utilizing the Supreme Court's criteria held that
the doctrine of admission by non-denial, as proscribed in Miranda
v. Arizona, s was not to be removed retroactively. The court was
particularly concerned with the longevity of the doctrine 6' and its
previous approval by the Supreme Court.66 These factors coupled with the effect on the administration of justice were sufficient
for the court to conclude that prospective removal was proper.
In other words, the wide-spread use of evidence under this doctrine
to convict accused criminals, with the availability of the writ of
habeas corpus for collateral attack, indicated a possible mass of relitigation of prior convictions.
The Shadd case, though not controlling in civil litigation, does
exhibit the court's respect for reliance on established rules of law
that are subsequently overruled and its reluctance to penalize the
state for such reliance. The procedural and substantive distinc59. Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 87, 223 A.2d
296, 299 (1966) (Emphasis added.) See generally Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v.

Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
60. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
61. Ibid. But see, Walker v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 223 A.2d
265 (Md. 1966) (measuring defendant's reliance).
62. 423 Pa. 82, 223 A.2d 296 (1966).
63. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

64. Commonwealth v. Vento, 410 Pa. 350, 189 A.2d 161 (1963); Com-

monwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 398 Pa. 23, 156 A.2d 527 (1959); Com-

monwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Shupp, 365 Pa. 439, 75 A.2d 587 (1950); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa.
419, 32 A.2d 889 (1943); Commonwealth v. Aston, 227 Pa. 112, 75 Atl. 1019
(1910); Ettinger v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 338 (1881).

65. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
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tions of criminal and civil'law 8 foreclose the adoption of the.Supreme Court's criteria to determine the proper application of the
removal of charitable immunity. It would seem, however, that the
reliance factor coupled with. resultant injustice are considerations common to both.
7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kuchinic v. McCrory,Q
a case of first impression, alluded to the reliance exception. .The
McCrory court stated:
[T] here are occasions when a party is givei the benefit of a
change in the law in order to prevent an injustice, especially when, as here, the other party could not have
68
changed his position in reliance on the initial decision.
The facts of McCrory qualify this general assertion to reduce it.
to
dictum. McCrory, a consolidation of three cases involved wrongful death actions arising from an airplane accident occurring in
Georgia in 1957. The three passengers and the pilot, whose estate was defendant in the cases, were all residents of Pennsylvania.
The jury returned a verdict for the pilot's estate, making a special
finding that the pilot was not guilty of gross negligence.
Under the conflict of law rule then applicable the case was
tried and the jury was charged according to.the substantive law of
Georgia. Georgia, by statute,69 required gross negligence to. b6
proved before a guest could recover from his host . Seven years
after the date of the accident Pennsylvania overruled the lex
loci delicti rule in Griffith v. United Airlines. 70 As of the date
of the Griffith decision the case had been 'tried and verdict rendered, but the consolidated case was pending appeal. Thus, appellant contended in the appeal that Griffith required Pennsylvania
law, which allows recovery for simple negligence in the host-guest
situation, to be applied and not Georgia law. The appellee con'tended that appellants' failure to take exception to the application
of Georgia law or the charge, to the jury foreclosed the issue on
appeal. In adopting this singular -position the court stated the ap. 6f
pellee's "argument
does not question the retroactive application
'1
Griffith.
Two factual points render this case little, if any, authority as to
whether Flagiello is retroactive: (1) the McCrory case was pending when G#iffith was decided, and (2) appellee did not raise the
66. There are four major distinctions: (1) availability of the writ
of habeas corpus for collateral attack; (2) application of the presumption
of prejudice, see Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966);
(3) prohibition against ex post facto laws; and (4) Article III of the U.S.
Constitution limiting the federal judicial power to "cases" and "controversies."

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Note, 71 YALE L. REV. 907- (1962).

422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966)..
Id. at 625, 222 A.2d at 900 (dictum).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-107, 105-203 (1936).
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).•
422 Pa. at 624, 222 A.2d at 900, ..

Winter 1967]

COMMENTS

issue of whether Griffith was retroactive. Apparently, the only
case pending when Flagiello was decided was Siewicz v. Wyoming
Valley Hosp.72 which was decided in accord with Flagiello. The
causes of action involved in this Comment are those not pending
appeal as of the date of decision in Flagiello.
The abandonment of a conflict of law rule would logically require retroactive application under the general rule. The reliance
exception would have no application in this area. The appellee in
McCrory could not assert that the deceased pilot had relied on the
lex loci delicti rule and the estate will suffer undue hardship or injustice by its abrogation in Griffith. It is obvious that flight plans
are not made, or the situs of vacations chosen, or business trips
arranged with any consideration being given to which state's law
governs in the event of a mishap.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also used language that
would indicate that the rights and liabilities of the parties are determined by the law at the time the cause of action arises. In
Kilian v. Allegheny County Distributors,7 involving the procedural question of whether a foreign corporation was "doing busiiness" in Pennsylvania, the court stated " [w] hile substantive rights
are settled as of the time the cause arises, rights in procedural
matters

. . .

are determined by the law in force at the time of the

institution of the action. ''74 If this blanket statement is in fact the
law of Pennsylvania the holding in McCrory was erroneous and
the causes of action arising prior to Flagiello should be governed
by pre-Flagiellolaw.
The dictum as to substantive rights announced in Kilian cannot
be reconciled with the supreme court's position in either Flagiello
or Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College & Hosp.7 5 In the latter
case the immunity was upheld by a four to three decision, with
Justice Bok, concurring, being of the opinion that immunity should
have been removed, but the removal should be prospective only. 76
72. 417 Pa. 533, 208 A.2d 238 (1965).
73. 409 Pa. 344, 185 A.2d 517 (1962). Generally the recognized rule
is that procedural rules are applied retroactively based on the assumption
that no party can have a vested right in a particular mode of procedure.
See Curtis v. Barby, 366 P.2d 616 (Okla. 1961); Independent Cotton Oil
Co. v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 Pac. 969 (1911). Inherent in the procedural-substantive distinction is the difficulty of classification. Compare
Chykirda v. Yanush, 131 Conn. 565, 41 A.2d 449 (1945) with Mickel v. New
England Coal & Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671, 47 A.2d 187 (1946).
74. 409 Pa. at 350-51, 185 A.2d at 520. See also Menges v. Dentler,
33 Pa. 495 (1859).
75. 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
76. Justice Bok, concurring, stated:
I favor abolishing the immunity of hospitals for their torts but
by the prospective method adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932)....
Until the majority of this court agrees with me, I prefer to see
the immunity continue.
Id. at 442-43, 172 A.2d at 778 (concurring opinion).
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Dissenting Justice Musmanno vigorously attacked the immunity
theory and was of the opinion that its removal had to be retroactive. 77 Justice Cohen, also dissenting, urged the removal of the
immunity in the same manner adopted in Parker, Kojis and Molitot, 78 i.e., abolishing immunity in the adjudicated case and all
causes of action arising after the date of the decision. Thus, if
"substantive rights are settled as of the time the cause arises" the
abrogation of immunity, as was subsequently done in Flagiello,
could only be applied prospectively. Moreover, when the court
did abolish charitable immunity in Flagiello the removal of immunity was applied to that case.
The dictum in Kilian and divergence of opinions in Hahnemann are indicative of the problems that must be encountered to
determine the point of departure of the defense of charitable immunity in Pennsylvania. Purely prospective application does not
have to be considered, because removal of the immunity defense
was applied to the defendant in Flagiello. Therefore, the court has
four choices: (1) the doctrine of prospective operation, based on
the presumption of reliance, using the "reward" and "dictum"
factors to justify Flagiello and Siewicz; (2) The Myers rule; (3)
the New Jersey rule; or (4) retroactivity, without recognition of
the reliance exception.
The history of charitable immunity and fundamental justice
would mitigate against the adoption of absolute retroactivity. The
immunity was established in Pennsylvania in 188879 and was never
seriously challenged until Hahnemann in 1961. Until Flagiello
the court had continuously maintained that the immunity had
become an established rule of law of the state and its abrogation
was purely a legislative function.80 The court fortified this position with stare decisis and the necessity of protecting charitable
institutions' assets. Even after the landmark decision of George77. 404 Pa. 424, 443, 172 A.2d 769, 778 (dissenting opinion). It is interesting to note that four justices opposed the immunity in principle, but
were unable to agree on its "point of departure." Justice Musmanno, felt
the removal had to be absolutely retroactive because to do otherwise would
be infringing on the legislative function and that the appellants would not

be compensated. Had Justice Musmanno accepted the compromise of "par-

tially retroactive" removal as proposed by Justice Cohen in his concurring

opinion, both of his objections would have been pacified. Moreover, Justice
Cohen's compromise was closer in principle to the position taken by Justice

Bok than Justice Musmanno's adherence to the outmoded declaratory
theory of law. Conceivably, Justice Cohen's compromise could have re-

sulted in overruling charitable immunity four years earlier.
78.
79.
80.

404 Pa. 424, 473, 172 A.2d 769, 794 (dissenting opinion).
Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 Atl. 553 (1888).
Paterlini v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 247 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. 1918);

Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 AUt. 1087 (1910); Siidekum
v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946);
'Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951); Knecht v. St. Mary's
Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958); Betts v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n
of Erie, 83 Pa. Super. 545 (1924).
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town College v. Hughes8 l in 1942 and the commentators' vigorous
criticism, the Pennsylvania court upheld the immunity on four
separate occasions.8 2 The Hahnemann case, in effect, maintained
the previous position that the immunity should be removed prospectively. Chief Justice Jones, speaking for the Hahnemann court,
adopted the position taken in Knecht v. St. Mary's Hosp., a wherein
the latter court stated:
A rule of non-liability, even though judge-made, that
has become as firmly fixed in the law of this State as has
the charitable immunity from tort liability, should not be
abrogated otherwise than by a statute made to operate prospectively. If the rule were to be abandoned by court decision, it would lay open to liability all charities for their
torts of the past that were not barred by the statute of
limitations ....

The injustice of such an imposition of

liability upon charities that theretofore had a right to rely
on the rule of immunity is readily apparent. Whereas, if
and when the rule is abrogated prospectively, which the
legislature could provide, all charities then made subject to
tort liability for the future could protect themselves by
appropriate insurance.84
Justice Bok, in his concurring opinion in Hahnemann felt that
under Sunburst the immunity could be overruled and applied prospectively by the court. Thus, Chief Justice Jones and Justice Bok
differed only as to which branch of the government, the court or the
legislature, should remove the immunity. Both expressly recognized that the immunity should only be abrogated prospectively.
To charitable institutions the Hahnemann decision reinforced
the frequently stated position that if the immunity was to be abolished it would only operate prospectively. Uninsured charities
would not be motivated to protect themselves until either the
court or the legislature did in fact abolish the immunity. To impose liability for past torts on charities which because of the
court's position in Hahnemann and previous decisions have failed
to insure themselves, is clearly unjust.
The adoption of the doctrine of prospective operation, as
utilized in Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan, would also be unsatisfactory, principally because the presumption of reliance does not
reflect the factual truth in all cases. In 1962 at least seventy-five
per cent of state-aided hospitals in Pennsylvania carried public
liability insurance.8 5 It would seem that if the charitable institu81. 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
82. Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45
A.2d 59 (1946); Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951); Knecht
v. St. Mary's Hosp., 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958); Michael v. Hahnemann
Medical College & Hosp., 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
83. 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958).
84. Id. at 78, 140 A.2d at 32.
85. TABULATION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON PUBLIC LIABILITY
INSV/RANCE COVERAGE OF STATE HOSPITALS (Jan. 1962 Survey by the Office
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tion has not in fact relied on the immunity that the injured plaintiff should be permitted to recover.
The remaining two choices, the Myers rule and the New Jersey
rule, are based on factual demonstration of reliance and are more
suitable to resolve the question of the immunity's point of departure. Under Hahnemann it would seem that an uninsured
charitable institution could escape retroactive application if either
the New Jersey rule or the Myers rule was applied. In effect
Hahnemann was a five to two decision against retroactive application of the removal of the immunity. Thus, under the strict New
Jersey rule the uninsured charity could have justifiably relied on a
pronouncement by the state's highest court. Since the charity is
uninsured it can show the requisite prejudice by failing to adequately protect itself.
Under the Myers rule the defendant would not have to establish the cumulative elements required by the New Jersey rule. The
singular inquiry would be whether the charitable institution was
insured or uninsured at the time the negligent act occurred. This
would be a more practical approach because it eliminates courtmade distinctions that are inevitable under the New Jersey rule.
It is not inconceivable that the imponderable of "justifiable reliance," as required under the New Jersey rule, would create a divergence of opinion. Likewise, the imponderable of "prejudiced to a
substantial degree" is a concept that would cause difficulty.
The New Jersey rule would require appeal in almost all cases
involving the question of the point of departure of the immunity
to ascertain whether the factual situation satisfied its broad, undefined elements. This lack of predictability is not present in the
Myers rule. While predictability is of less significance because of
the limited number of cases that will arise in this area, it should
be recognized as a factor favoring the Myers rule.
Ease of administration is also a factor favoring the Myers
rule. The charitable institution could assert the affirmative defense with the necessary factual allegations in the pleadings. The
trial judge could then determine whether the charity was uninof the Attorney Gen. of Pa.).

The survey discloses that of the 184 state

aided hospitals (151 reporting) 145 carried liability insurance coverage.
Of the state-aided hospitals reporting, less than four percent did not have
liability insurance coverage.
The survey does not indicate the nature of the risks insured against.
There is no indication that the insurance coverage includes medical malpractice.
The survey does disclose that the defense of charitable immunity is
seldom invoked. During the period from January, 1957, through July,
1961, there were a total of 3,008 negligence suits instituted against stateaided hospitals. The immunity defense was invoked only 44 times.
Beyond this survey of state-aided hospitals research discloses no similar survey concerning the insurance coverage of other recognized charitable institutions.
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sured at the time the alleged negligent act occurred and the availability of the immunity defense. The simplicity of the insurance inquiry ought to expedite the determination of the issue without
delaying the actual trial, if any is required. This ease of administration is definitely not present in the New Jersey rule. Because of
the necessity of affirmatively demonstrating the undefined elements, factual disputes will arise and require judicial determination. Thus, the New Jersey rule has the effect of delaying the trial
on the merits in order to determine the availability of the immunity
defense.
Basing liability on the sole ground of liability insurance coverage is appropriate and logical in this area. It is the best manifestation of a charitable institution's reliance or non-reliance on the immunity. If an insured charity is found liable for the negligence of
its employees it has an available source of revenue to satisfy the
judgment without detrimentally affecting its assets or capability
of continuing its purpose. Certainly the insurer has no reason to
object because this is exactly the risk insured against. Of course,
the cost of the coverage in some instances, was based on the availability of the immunity defense. It should be noted that unlike
the Myers decision, liability should not be limited to the extent of
the insurance coverage. Even if the charity is insured, however,
the alleged negligent act must come within the insured risk before
the removal of the immunity is applied retroactively.
The extent of insurance coverage does not have to be revealed
in the actual trial. Under either the New Jersey or the Myers rule
the insurance inquiry is made by the judge in pre-trial procedure.
Based on this determination the judge can, if proper, give the defendant judgment on the pleadings based on the immunity defense
or rule the immunity defense is not available and proceed to trial to
determine the issue of negligence.
CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court by its prior decisions has
established and maintained the immunity defense for charitable
institutions, and as to the institutions which have relied on the
immunity, it is patently unjust to remove the immunity retroactively. The court should recognize the reliance exception to prevent
injustice and undue hardship resulting from the adoption of a relation back theory. Clearly the most equitable application of the reliance exception is the Myers rule.
JERRY R. DUFFIE

